


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CHILE: The military junta continues to encounter small pockets of armed resistance in Santiago, but elsewhere the country is reported returning to normal.

Resistance is centered in industrial sectors and low-income areas of the city, and military leaders expect that it will be several days before the city is totally pacified. Casualties and arrests are reportedly numerous, and Chilean authorities have been urgently calling on the population to donate blood, medicines, and sanitary materials to be used in the care of the wounded.

According to Minister of Defense Admiral Carvajal and other military leaders, the junta members have been too preoccupied with pacification to consider future government policy and organization, and the main concern now is to ensure the distribution of food and fuel throughout the country.

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In an effort to portray a return to normalcy, the government-controlled radio network is broadcasting a number of messages of support from various civic, industrial, and professional groups and denying reports of damage or sabotage to public services in the capital. The junta's efforts are apparently aimed at countering reports being put out by a clandestine radio operated by followers of the late President. One such report, put out by leaders of Allende's Popular Unity coalition, alleges that the former commander of the army, General Prats, is leading a column of troops from the south to attack the

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[redacted] junta forces in Santiago. We have no other information to confirm or corroborate this report; in fact,

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[redacted] the Foreign Minister's press aide, Willoughby, categorically denied rumors concerning Prats' opposition. He said that Prats was home in Santiago and would soon be taking a foreign trip--the details of which are to be released today.

* * * *

International reaction to the coup continues to be widespread and vehement. Protest demonstrations have been organized in major cities, and several Latin American countries have declared three days of official mourning. Two other Latin American countries, Brazil and Uruguay, however, are the first to extend recognition to the new government.

At the United Nations, the Cuban Ambassador has formally requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the "grave act" committed by the Chilean armed forces against the Cuban Embassy in Santiago and a Cuban merchant ship in Valparaiso. The President of the Council, a Yugoslav, has begun consultations with other Council members.

The Soviet Union has reacted to the events in Chile by issuing a statement in the name of the Soviet Central Committee that sharply denounces "reactionary forces in Chile." The statement, issued on 13 September, said these forces had been "backed by foreign imperialist forces" throughout the three years of Allende's rule, but did not specifically accuse any outside powers of involvement in the coup itself. Soviet media, however, have begun to use the device of quoting third parties that have accused the US of responsibility.

The Central Committee statement also expressed full solidarity with leftist forces in Chile and firm confidence that they will continue the struggle. It is doubtful, however, that the Soviets see much prospect that the military take-over will be reversed.

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[REDACTED] Soviet
options now appear to be limited.

The Soviets could stage protests against the coup. A broadcast on the Soviet domestic service on 13 September reported that citizens were "reaffirming their solidarity with the working people of Chile in towns and villages throughout the USSR." Organized protests have not been allowed near the US Embassy for several years, however, and the government probably will avoid actions that could jeopardize US-Soviet relations. [REDACTED]

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ISRAEL-SYRIA: Tel Aviv claims to have downed 13 Syrian MIG-21s, while losing only one Mirage, in the clash yesterday near the Syrian port of Tartus. This is the first aerial engagement between the two countries since 8 January when the Israelis apparently downed six Syrian aircraft.

An Israeli military officer claims that Israeli aircraft were on a routine reconnaissance mission over Syria when they were intercepted by the Syrian MIGs. In the ensuing engagement, nine Syrian and one Israeli aircraft reportedly were lost. Efforts to rescue the downed Israeli pilot apparently resulted in a second engagement in which four more Syrian MIGs were lost.

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[REDACTED] Damascus has acknowledged that eight of its aircraft were hit.

The Israelis fly occasional reconnaissance missions over the Syrian ports of Tartus and Latakia. The current mission may have been to determine whether the Soviets have delivered new military equipment to the Syrians.

Prior to this engagement, the Syrians had not challenged Israeli air incursions since the incident last January. If the Syrian reaction yesterday signaled a change in this policy the heavy losses sustained may give Damascus pause.

LAOS: The protocol to implement the February peace agreement has been signed, but there may be some delays in carrying it out.

The coalition government authorized by the protocol will not come into being until it is invested by the King, and that cannot happen until the rightist-dominated National Assembly approves. Prime Minister Souvanna anticipates no major problems with the assembly. As a precaution, however, he is planning a parliamentary maneuver which is designed to gain *de facto* approval without a formal vote by the deputies.

Certain military provisions of the protocol, such as setting up boundary markers in the countryside, may be implemented before a new government is formed, and planning for others may also get under way. The key provisions do not go into effect, however, until investiture is complete. For example, the 60-day period for the removal of all foreign forces from Laos will not begin until the government is formally organized. Moreover, the actual neutralization of Vientiane and Luang Prabang--which involves the withdrawal of troops from both cities and the establishment of a joint security force--will almost certainly not take place until the political requirements are met.

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NORTH VIETNAM: The important autumn rice crop could be damaged by heavy rains and possible flooding this weekend if typhoon Marge strikes. According to forecasts, this typhoon will be just north of Haiphong today. Its likely path would be along the northern edge of the Red River Delta, where it could cause heavy precipitation and rising river levels.

With the exception of the recent round of typhoons, this year's rainy season has been normal. River levels have been slightly higher than last year, but well below the levels that occurred during the disastrous floods in 1971. Some small tertiary dikes have broken, inundating ricefields in a few areas, but this is an annual occurrence that does not involve major flooding. Hanoi always fears a rainy season catastrophe, however, because a combination of heavy rain, rising rivers, and typhoons, combined with the poor drainage in the delta, could cause considerable damage to protective dikes and field crops.

USSR-CHINA: Soviet officials have sought to play down any anxieties they may have about developments at the Chinese Tenth Party Congress, and to warn that Peking could "overnight" turn its hostility against the US.

In private statements to US Embassy officers on 30 August and 11 September, Soviet officials took the line that the congress marked a victory for Chou En-lai and implied that this development was better than having to deal with an unknown quantity. Chou's report to the congress pulled few punches in attacking Moscow, but the Soviet officials avoided mention of this, as well as of Peking's careful endorsement of the Sino-American rapprochement. Instead, Viktor Trifonov--a China specialist in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs--professed to regard as a positive development the fact that Chou had "left the door open" to the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations, claiming that this position had been endorsed by the Chinese party for the first time. When asked about signs that the USSR might declare that China is no longer a socialist country, Trifonov denied any such intention.

In an effort to encourage caution in the US attitude toward China, Trifonov argued that the Chinese party congress has touched off a new round of political infighting. He said Chou's authority probably is unimpaired at this juncture, but the prospects for continuing his policies are not bright, once he passes from the scene. Trifonov claimed that leftist radicals now have the edge among the party vice-chairmen and the politburo's standing committee. He also cited the secrecy of the congress and its failure to name a party secretary-general as evidence of sharp differences among factions within the leadership.

Whether the Soviets really believe that the results of the congress were not as unfavorable to Moscow as might have been anticipated, the Soviets are well aware that even the appearance of a deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations could be exploited by the US.

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NATO - FORCE REDUCTIONS: The allies remain divided over a number of important issues as they attempt to prepare a common position for the force reduction talks that begin in Vienna late next month.

At the North Atlantic Council meeting on 12 September, the West Germans argued that the concept of imposing a "common ceiling" on NATO and Warsaw Pact ground forces in central Europe should be introduced early in the negotiations. They contend that two negotiating phases are clearly necessary to achieve this goal and that the allied position should call for an explicit agreement in the first phase to hold a second phase. The Germans maintain that the allies should also make clear that the second phase would primarily involve NATO and Warsaw Pact forces other than those of the US and the USSR.

The Netherlands agrees, but is concerned that an early effort to get specific agreement on this matter might lead the Vienna talks into a premature debate on second-phase questions.

The UK--which after re-evaluating its force reduction policy seems inclined to be more cooperative--also warned that it was not only wrong but dangerous to try to specify the contents of the second phase. While the British accept for internal Alliance use the "common ceiling" figure of 700,000 troops, they hope it will not be necessary to mention the figure to the other side in the first phase of the actual negotiations. They acknowledge, however, that the tactical situation in the talks will be the determining factor. The British think it is a mistake to specify--as the US would like--a two- to four-month duration of the initial round of talks, since experience shows they might drag on a good deal longer.

Turkey stressed the importance of the principle of undiminished Alliance security and argued that the allied position in its present form fails to

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give sufficient attention to the possibility of Warsaw Pact forces threatening NATO's southern flank as a result of force reductions in central Europe. The Turks have said they might hold up agreement on an allied position if they do not get satisfaction on these points. The Greeks and Italians voiced similar concerns at the Council meeting.

NATO has set a target date of 30 September for settling these disagreements, although the force reduction talks do not open until 30 October. [redacted]

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